Do not use this instruction for criminal offenses that require “willfulness” to have a meaning greater than knowledge. For example, do not use this instruction for reckless driving cases; instead use WPIC 95.10 (Willful—Wanton—Definition—Reckless Driving). For obstructing cases, use WPIC 120.02.01 (Obstructing a Law Enforcement Officer—Willfully—Definition).
Use WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition) with this instruction.With regard to the bracketed language in the instruction, see the discussion of the Goble and Gerdts cases in the Comment to WPIC 10.02 (Knowledge—Knowingly—Definition).
RCW 9A.08.010(4).The statute. The statute does not define willfulness. It provides that acting knowingly satisfies a requirement of willfulness, RCW 9A.08.010(4), unless the law specifically imposes a requirement greater than knowledge. See RCW 9A.04.090 (applying RCW 9A.08.010 to all criminal offenses unless a statute specifically provides otherwise).
The statute deviates from pre-existing common law. Enacted in 1975, the statute represents a change from the pre-existing common law, under which willfulness generally required more than knowledge. See State v. Buttolph, 199 Wn.App. 813, 816–817, 399 P.3d 554 (2017). For this reason, pre-1975 opinions need to be read in conjunction with the statute and the opinions interpreting that statute. Similarly, because the statute was adapted with some changes from the Model Penal Code, see WPIC 10.00 (Introduction—Statutory Levels of Culpability) opinions from other jurisdictions pre-dating their adoption of the Model Penal Code would also need to be read with caution.
See WPIC 10.00 (Introduction—Statutory Levels of Culpability) for a general discussion of the hierarchy of mental states set forth in RCW 9A.08.010.